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The period immediately after World War II was a vital one for diplomatic relations and, with the
Soviet Union emerging as a new superpower, it was particularly important for Britain’s relations with
America. Britain and America After World War II is the first book to focus on the role of the British
Embassy in Washington during this period. John Dumbrell finds the book is a model of intelligent
and conscientious diplomatic historical research.
Britain and America after World War II: Bilateral Relat ions and
the Beginnings of  the Cold War. By Richard Wevill. I. B. Tauris.
May 2012.
  
In this very carefully researched study, Richard Wevill of fers an
account of  the role played by the Brit ish Embassy in Washington in
relat ion to US foreign policy in the early years of  the Truman
Presidency. The book covers the part ial rupture of  wart ime US-UK
cooperat ion, especially in relat ion to terms at tached to the
December 1945 loan agreement, policy towards Palest ine, and
(most seriously) the collapse of  mutuality in the f ield of  atomic
energy.
The book goes on to discuss the role played by the Embassy in the Anglo-American convergence
associated with the onset of  Cold War thinking in Washington, especially in the context  of  the
emerging Marshall Plan. In relat ion to the lat ter, Wevill highlights the cumulat ive impact of  Embassy
analyses of  American thinking in formulat ing London’s response to Washington’s init iat ives. The
Embassy was also involved – as was the case in the so-called Pentagon and Modus Vivendi talks
of 1947 – in direct  negot iat ions with American policymakers, as well as exert ing inf luence via more
informal contacts.
At one level, Wevill is concerned to provide a document-based account of  Embassy act ivit ies in his
chosen period – a period which to some degree has been neglected, at  least  in comparison with
the war years and with the ambassadorship of  Oliver Franks, who succeeded Lord Inverchapel in
May 1948. Wevill thus associates himself  with the work of  Michael Hopkins on Franks and the
study of  Brit ish ambassadors edited by Hopkins, John Kelly and John Young. A parallel
forthcoming study, of  US ambassadors to London, edited by Alison Holmes and Simon Rolfe, may
also be ment ioned here. Wevill presents his work as equally concerned with ‘the Embassy’ as with
his two ambassadors (Lords Halifax and Inverchapel). The Embassy is seen as having decisive
inf luence, of ten linked to the closeness of  its personnel to key American polit ical f igures, as well as
performing tradit ional roles of  representat ion and negot iat ion. Attent ion is drawn to various
diplomats associated with the Embassy, notably Roger Makins and his involvement in atomic
diplomacy. However, the personalit ies of  Halifax and Inverchapel do loom very large. Wevill is
concerned with the lat ter part  of  the former’s ambassadorial term – Halifax served from 1941 to
1946 – and tends to step aside from controversies associated with Halifax’s earlier career. Not ing
that Halifax arrived in Washington, “with the whif f  of  appeasement about him” (p. 33), Wevill
portrays Halifax as able to develop expert ise and inf luence.
Australian-born Inverchapel (formerly Clark Kerr) emerges as an eccentric f igure, composing
reports with the aid of  his quill pen. A reluctant public performer, Inverchapel did develop important
elite contacts, some deriving from his earlier service in Washington under Ambassador James
Bryce.
Wevill is clearly very sympathet ic to the Embassy and (despite a few reservat ions) its heads. On
the 1954 loan agreement, he sees the ‘professional’ Embassy, rather than the ‘amateur’ John
Maynard Keynes as giving the superior advice and leadership (p. 107). However, Wevill also reveals
the limits to Embassy inf luence. On Palest ine, American policy tended to be made at  the level of
the White House and by people (such as David Niles) with whom the Embassy had virtually no
formal contact . Inverchapel had good State Department links – despite some suspicion there of
his perceived emot ional pro-Zionism (p. 159) – but policy was of ten being made elsewhere. This
story – of  the Embassy being lef t  stranded when policy is made outside ‘normal’ diplomat ic
channels – is a familiar one, and was replicated to some degree under President George W. Bush.
Wevill also shows how the Embassy failed to ident ify key centres of  American opposit ion to the
cont inuat ion of  atomic cooperat ion (p. 133).
This is an excellent  book. It  is writ ten in the tradit ion of  rather methodologically and conceptually
conservat ive diplomat ic history. There is no at tempt here, for example, to use alliance theory to
structure discussion of  emerging US-UK power relat ions. Wevill might have developed his
treatment of  the Marshall Plan into a more sustained discussion of   Brit ish inf luence in the
emergence of  elite American understandings of  the early Cold War. A recent book by Marc
Selverstone of fers some pointers as to how this part icular research agenda might be furthered.
Wevill ploughs a fairly narrow, if  very fert ile, furrow. His self -denying ordinance in relat ion to Halifax
is defensible in terms of  t ime scale. However, it  is a lit t le disconcert ing to f ind the Embassy work of
Donald Maclean discussed at  several points, with only a footnote to explain that no “at tempt has
been made to assess the extent of  the damage he may have caused or to specif ically relate his
espionage act ivit ies to the role of  the embassy” (p. 235). Maclean served not only as First
Secretary in the Embassy Chancery, but also as Secretary of  the Combined Policy Commit tee,
concerned with US-UK atomic cooperat ion.
Wevill’s book is a model of  intelligent and conscient ious diplomat ic historical research. It  is
recommended without reservat ion to all students of  Anglo-American relat ions.
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